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Abstract
The paper reviews the origins of the comparative study of capitalism and of the di-
verse approaches applied to it in contemporary political economy. It distinguishes four 
models accounting for differences in the institutional make-up of national capitalist 
economies, which it refers to as the social embeddedness, power resource, historical-
institutionalist, and rationalist-functionalist model, respectively. Special attention is 
given to the rationalist-functionalist account of capitalist variety and its reception in 
the research literature. The paper concludes with remarks on the likely effect of the 
global financial crisis after 2007 on theories of political economy in general and of 
“varieties of capitalism” in particular. It argues that in future the commonalities and in-
terdependencies of national capitalisms deserve and are likely to receive more attention 
than their differences.
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz beschreibt die Ursprünge der vergleichenden Kapitalismusforschung und 
deren unterschiedliche Ansätze in der gegenwärtigen politischen Ökonomie. Vier Mo-
delle zur Erklärung der Unterschiede in der institutionellen Verfassung nationaler ka-
pitalistischer Systeme, die als Einbettungs-, Machtressourcen-, historisch-institutiona-
listisches und rationalistisch-funktionalistisches Modell bezeichnet werden, werden 
miteinander verglichen. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt dem rationalistisch-funktiona-
listischen Modell und seiner Rezeption in der Forschungsliteratur. Der Aufsatz schließt 
mit Bemerkungen zum wahrscheinlichen Einfluss der globalen Finanzkrise nach 2007 
auf die Theoriebildung in der politischen Ökonomie und insbesondere die „Varieties of 
Capitalism“-Debatte. Vermutet wird, dass in Zukunft die Gemeinsamkeiten und Inter-
dependenzen zwischen den nationalen kapitalistischen Systemen mehr Aufmerksam-
keit erfordern und erhalten werden als die Unterschiede.
4 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /12
Contents
Introduction: E pluribus unum? 5
1 National differences: Past, present, future 6
2 From convergence to diversity 10
3 Capitalist variety and the neoliberal turn 15
4 Varieties of capitalism, varieties of approaches 17
5 Institutional complementarity and comparative advantage 23
6 Not enough variety, too little history? The “VoC Debate” 27
7 From static variety to dynamic commonalities 34
8 Towards a new paradigm: A tentative summary 39
References 41
Streeck: E Pluribus Unum? Varieties and Commonalities of Capitalism 5
Introduction: E pluribus unum? 1
Nowhere on earth have the economic system and the essence of capitalism reached as full a 
development as in North America. (Sombart [1906]1976: 4)
Will the future social structures of Europe and America turn out the same or different? If the 
same: is America or Europe the “land of the future”? (Sombart [1906]1976: 24)
All the factors that till now have prevented the development of Socialism in the United States 
are about to disappear or to be converted into their opposite, with the result that in the next 
generation Socialism in America will very probably experience the greatest possible expansion 
of its appeal. (Sombart 1976 [1906]: 119)
That capitalism should take on different forms in different countries need not be sur-
prising. If the economy is, according to Karl Polanyi, an “instituted process” (Polanyi 
[1957]1992), it follows that capitalism, being a specific kind of economy, must be based 
in an institutionalized social order by and into which it is formed and organized. Social 
orders, however, differ in space and change over time. Private property, free markets, 
wage labor, joint stock companies, and modern finance emerged2 in or spread to dif-
ferent historical contexts and local traditions, institutions and power structures that 
could not but imprint themselves on the ways in which capitalism became “instituted” 
in different societies.3 
The story of capitalist variety and of the theories devised to account for it is a compli-
cated one, deeply intertwined as it is with domestic and global politics and the unfolding 
of the very history of capitalism itself. It is as much a subject for the sociology of knowl-
edge as it is a theme for economic sociology. This paper discusses current theories of the 
variations between capitalist national political economies. I begin, however, with reflec-
tions on the origin of the theme in nineteenth-century social science, on the premise that 
To be published, in a slightly shortened version, in Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg (eds.), 
The Sociology of Economic Life, 3rd edition, Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 2011. For helpful com-
ments and suggestions I am indebted to the editors and to Lucio Baccaro, Ronald Dore, Martin 
Höpner, and Christine Trampusch.
1 E pluribus unum means “From many, one.” It appears on most US currency, as well as on Air 
Force One.
2 For a defining account of capitalism and its evolution, see Ingham (2008).
3 On the history of the concept of capitalism and how it has been used at different times in social 
science and public discourse, see Chiapello (2006). In brief, Marx did not invent the concept 
and seems to have employed the word only rarely. Its current usage derives mainly from Som-
bart and Weber. In the late nineteenth century, the term referred to a modern institutional con-
figuration characterized by “the existence of an economic process oriented towards unlimited 
accumulation of capital, the importance of the firm as an agent of the system, private ownership 
of production resources, ‘free’ wage labour, free enterprise and competition, involvement of 
science in the process and increasing rationalization of economic activity” (Chiapello 2006: 36). 
While later the concept was appropriated by the Left, which gave it a polemical meaning, it was 
also adopted in the 1960s by American neoliberals, such as Milton Friedman, who used it with 
an aggressively affirmative connotation.
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social theories, just like societies and their institutions, can be properly understood only 
in historical context. Next I reconstruct, in more specific terms, the successive moves in 
postwar accounts of political economy, first to a shared expectation of imminent conver-
gence of differently institutionalized national capitalisms, or “industrial societies,” and 
then, by the end of the century, to a widespread belief in sustained political-economic 
variety or divergence. Following this I investigate the construction of the theories sup-
porting such beliefs, in light of the criticism they have attracted in the meantime. Finally, 
I suggest that theoretical progress will require that more attention be paid to the com-
monalities of divergent capitalisms and their interdependent histories.
1 National differences: Past, present, future
One cannot write about capitalism without recalling Marx. It is probably true that he was 
the first “convergence” theorist, his general “model” of capitalism – in the sense of its most 
advanced version – being Victorian England, beyond which a unified socialist world soci-
ety lay waiting. “The bourgeoisie,” Marx famously wrote in the Communist Manifesto,
has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production 
and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from 
under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national 
industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed … In place of the old local and 
national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-
dependence of nations. (Marx/Engels [1848]1977: 222)
This does not mean that Marx did not recognize differences, at least for his time and 
age. For one thing, while he saw capitalism as universal, its politics, as long as it lasted, 
remained national: 
Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at 
first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must … first of all settle matters with 
its own bourgeoisie. (Marx/Engels [1848]1977: 230)
But ultimately this was no more than an intermediate stage: 
National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, ow-
ing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to 
uniformity in the mode of production and in their conditions of life corresponding thereto.
(Marx/Engels [1848]1977: 235)
Secondly, while for Marx-the-theorist capitalism was the same thing everywhere, Marx-
the-economic-historian understood that its emergence and ascendance was far from 
simultaneous and could, for this reason alone, take quite different forms in different 
countries, if only for an intermediate period of transition. In particular, Marx notes 
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that the history of “primitive accumulation” – the “expropriation of the agricultural 
producer, the peasant, from the soil,” which for him was “the basis of the whole process” 
– “assumes different aspects (in different countries), and runs through its various phases 
in different orders of succession, and at different periods. In England alone, which we 
take as our example, has it the classic form” (Marx [1867, 1887]1967: 669f.; italics added). 
In fact, the last chapters of the first volume of Capital are replete with references to 
national differences and international interdependencies. England is compared to Italy, 
where capitalist development took off later, and the English enclosures movement is 
explained by the economic opportunities created by “the rapid rise of the Flemish wool 
manufactures, and the corresponding rise in the price of wool in England” (Marx [1867, 
1887]1967: 672). As for his native Germany, Marx considered its economic backward-
ness as an indication of general cultural backwardness and of a need to be rescued by 
the global progress of the bourgeois revolution from what the Manifesto calls “the idi-
ocy of rural life” (Marx/Engels [1848]1977: 225).4
Of course, Marx’s was just one voice among many in a continuing debate on national 
differences and similarities that accompanied capitalist development from the begin-
ning.5 Throughout the nineteenth century, European countries compared themselves 
to each other, and were compared by their citizens, in a search for indications of their 
prospects in the international rivalry for power and preeminence, as well as for signs 
of coming convergence or lasting divergence, promising or terrifying as these may have 
appeared, depending on ideology and location. This story cannot possibly be told here. 
After Marx, the German fascination with England continued with Eduard Bernstein, 
the socialist revisionist, who considered English democracy and Victorian reformism 
a model for postrevolutionary Social Democracy, and with the liberal-bourgeois na-
tionalist Max Weber. Differences between German and English industrial organization, 
labor relations, training regimes, technology, social policy, and the like were interpreted 
in terms of German backwardness, to be overcome by determined reformism, for the 
benefit of German labor (Bernstein 1899) or for German national survival in the com-
ing wars (Weber 1895). Interestingly, whatever may have divided Bernstein and Weber, 
they no longer took it for granted, as had Marx, that the laggards in capitalist develop-
ment would with time automatically catch up with the leaders: becoming like the Eng-
lish would take effort, but one that was very much worth making.
Just as England, and later the United States, was the country of reference for Germany, 
Germany was “the other,” and indeed often a mysterious other, for the British, and cer-
4 For example, in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels declared with biting sarcasm that it was 
impossible for a materialist, that is, economically based or, in other words, modern conception 
of history to take root in Germany “because the Germans lack not only the necessary power of 
comprehension and the material but also the ‘evidence of their senses,’ for across the Rhine you 
cannot have any experience of these things since history has stopped happening” (Marx/Engels 
[1844]1977: 164).
5 Given that the rise of capitalism by and large coincided with that of nationalism, this is hardly 
surprising.
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tainly also for France after its humiliation in the war of 1870/71. In 1885, the young 
Emile Durkheim was sent by the French government to Germany to study the enemy’s 
presumably superior education system. The British never quite recovered from the 
shock of the World Exhibition of 1862, where for the first time they had to face techno-
logically superior German machinery and other manufactures (“very good indeed,” Sir 
Joseph Whitworth).6 It was then, at the latest, that German “competitiveness,” as it later 
came to be called, became a central topic of British political and economic discourse, a 
discourse that early on extended to what were perceived as differences not just in indus-
try but also in social organization generally. How could a society whose traditionalism, 
authoritarianism, and collectivism contrasted so unfavorably to the Spencerian mod-
ernism, liberalism, and individualism (Spencer 1969 [1884, 1892]) of which Victorian 
Britain was so proud – how could such a society aspire to outcompete the most “pro-
gressive” society on earth? Was there something economically advantageous in social 
traditionalism? Had the progress of civilization destroyed economically valuable social 
resources? Was England already on the decline, like other empires in the past? Just as 
Tacitus had held up the virtuous Germanic barbarians to the decadent Romans of his 
time (Tacitus [98 AD]1894), growing segments of the British public began to wonder 
whether civilization had gone too far. Were the German savages, with their collective 
discipline and their authoritarian-interventionist state, better prepared for the impend-
ing struggle for supremacy between the nations of Europe?
Early on, perceived differences in social and economic organization between Germany 
and the Anglo-Saxon world were described in pairs of concepts, sometimes conceived 
as dichotomies, sometimes as continua, such as Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, collec-
tivism and individualism, state and market, status and contract, or, from the German 
perspective, culture and civilization. Explicitly or implicitly, as we will see, they still 
figure prominently in contemporary constructions of capitalist variety. Moreover, Ger-
many has remained the model alternative to standard capitalism, which continues to be 
ideally represented by Britain and, increasingly over time, the United States, regardless 
of the many differences between the two. Japan was admitted into the game only later, 
in the 1980s, when the “competitiveness” of Japan’s manufacturing industry made it-
self felt especially in Anglo-American markets, and was put, with whatever justification, 
into the German box or assigned to the “German” end of a continuum between more 
or less “normal” capitalisms. 
One explanation for the lasting prominence of the “German model” in the discourse on 
the varieties of capitalism may be the strong presence of German institutional econom-
ics, especially in the United States, in the formative years of the discipline at the end of 
the nineteenth century. The Historical School, and in particular the Kathedersozialis-
6 In response, Parliament in 1887 passed the Merchandise Marks Act that required German prod-
ucts to be labeled “Made in Germany,” to warn British customers to stay away from them. It is 
a source of lasting national pride in Germany that the measure backfired when, to the contrary, 
products with that label were sought out because of their assumed superior quality.
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ten – the “socialists of the chair” – not only emphasized the role of institutions, thereby 
asking their non-German readers to acquaint themselves with “strange” practices in a 
faraway country, but also attributed a major role to the state and politics, quite unlike 
Anglo-American liberalism.7 Later, of course, the progress of economics towards ab-
stract universalism made empirical differences between institutions disappear behind 
prescriptive principles of ideal institutional design. As a side-effect, this relieved non-
German economists of the need to learn about German peculiarities, and indeed about 
any foreign peculiarities. 
To organize the discussion of national variety in capitalism, both its analytics and its 
normative implications and practical intentions, we may, like Albert Hirschman, dis-
tinguish between a social condition of market dominance, on the one hand, and one of 
the persistence of precapitalist forms of social organization, on the other (Hirschman 
1982), taking the former to represent the Anglo-American and the latter the German 
or Japanese “model” of capitalism as they figure in the debate. Both positive and nega-
tive effects may be attributed to each of the two conditions (Hirschman 1982: 1481). 
The positive effects of Anglo-American-style market dominance are captured by what 
Hirschman calls the “doux-commerce thesis,” a view that we may, by and large, identify 
with authors such as Weber and Bernstein, and certainly with Spencer. The negative 
effects of markets, by contrast, are captured by the “self-destruction thesis” – which, of 
course, is most explicit in the theories of Marx and his followers. 
As to conditions, or countries, in which precapitalist institutional forms remain influ-
ential, liberal reformers find mostly negative effects, as summarized in what Hirschman 
calls the “feudal-shackles thesis.” Here one would presumably locate someone like Al-
exander Gerschenkron ([1952]1992), but also Max Weber with his fear of accelerated 
bureaucratization in “Lutheran” countries and cultures lacking the proper Calvinist-
ascetic “spirit.”8 The most interesting case for our purposes, however, is when positive 
effects are ascribed to precapitalist institutions (what Hirschman calls the “feudal-bless-
ings thesis”). Hirschman discusses such effects mostly in the negative, in terms of the 
possible problems that the absence of a feudal past may cause a society such as that of the 
United States. One can, however, turn the matter around, in the manner of British and, 
later, American observers looking at the rise of Germany and then of Japan as industrial 
powers, wondering whether a little more Gemeinschaft and a little less Gesellschaft might 
in fact be an asset rather than a liability, even – and indeed precisely – in the advanced 
industrialized world of the twentieth century (for Japan, see Dore [1983]1992). It is 
this intuition which still underlies much of today’s “varieties of capitalism” literature, 
although in Germany itself it took time to take hold, especially after Germany’s defeat 
7 Authors such as Adolph Wagner, Gustav Schmoller, and Werner Sombart were well known to 
early American economists and studied extensively by them.
8 As Claus Offe recently pointed out, Weber was what one could call a pessimistic convergence the-
orist in that he foresaw the United States becoming like Europe, which in his view would amount 
to the historical elimination of the last remnants of a free bourgeois way of life (Offe 2006).
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in the First and Second World Wars.9 In fact, as early as the 1920s economic progress 
became widely associated in Germany with Americanization, especially with large cor-
porations, industrial engineering, and mass production.10 Hardly anyone in Germany 
at the time saw competitive advantage in social backwardness, the latter being identi-
fied among other things with artisanal production in small, owner-operated firms. The 
powerful German metalworkers’ union, DMV, kept sending delegations to Detroit to 
study Fordist and Taylorist “rationalization,” which it regarded as welcome tools for in-
creasing productivity and raising wages, as well as for overcoming the despotism of the 
foreman on the shop floor. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the Nazis be-
lied their anti-modernist and anti-cosmopolitan rhetoric by inviting Henry Ford, who 
of course was far from finding National Socialism and in particular National-Socialist 
anti-Semitism repulsive, to help set up the Volkswagen plant in Wolfsburg on the model 
of (and with used machinery from) Dearborn, Michigan.
2 From convergence to diversity
The two decades after World War II were the high time of convergence theory. Clearly 
this reflected the unprecedented economic superiority of the United States during the 
period, and its position as both the uncontestable hegemon of the Western capitalist 
world and the envy of its Communist opposition. As Europe re-imported sociology 
from the United States, it gratefully received as part of the package a theory of social 
development, or “modernization,” that as a matter of course identified the US as the 
model for all other countries to emulate.11 In political economy, with the European 
economies destroyed and any German Sonderweg12 discredited, theorists of modern-
9 The claim that German traditions of social organization had, as early as the late German Empire, 
given rise to a distinct industrial order with specific competitive capabilities unmatched by the 
more liberal Anglo-American version of capitalism was made mostly retrospectively in the last 
third of the twentieth century. One of its most outspoken proponents is the historian Werner 
Abelshauser, who has described Germany as “the first post-liberal nation.” Recently, Abelshauser 
has described the country and its economy as embarked on a “German road to the twenty-first 
century” (Abelshauser 2005).
10 It is important to note that, early in the twentieth century, Europe viewed the United States 
not so much as a country with free markets, but mostly as one with huge firms, giant trusts, 
and modern management in the Chandlerian sense. Contemporary European expectations that 
capitalism would become increasingly “organized” (Rudolf Hilferding), fully shared by early 
emigrants such as Schumpeter, were certainly not discouraged by observation, even close ob-
servation, of the American case.
11 For an especially impressive example see Talcott Parsons’ treatise on “The System of Modern 
Societies” (1971). 
12 Sonderweg means “special path.” The term was invented by German nationalists to distinguish 
German modern society from other modern societies, especially in the West. Today it is used by 
“Westernized” anti-nationalists to label claims of German national distinctiveness as politically 
dangerous.
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ization defined as economic growth, which was defined in turn as market expansion, 
claimed that there was one and only one path of industrial and, which was the same, of 
social progress equally suited for and equally desired by everyone (Rostow [1960]1990). 
Differences between countries obviously existed, but to the extent that they mattered, 
they could safely be assumed to be eliminated in the course of the world’s consensual 
pursuit of the American way. Expectations of global convergence extended even beyond 
the West and the so-called “developing world” to include the Soviet bloc. Indeed, the 
USSR itself was found by prominent American scholars and policy intellectuals to be 
on its way toward a system of “pluralist industrialism” that looked conspicuously like 
postwar New Deal America.13
It was only in the revolutionary period of the late 1960s and early 1970s that conver-
gence theory came to be challenged by new approaches emphasizing diversity and in-
sisting on the possibility and, indeed, desirability of alternative paths of socioeconomic 
development (on the following, see Crouch/Streeck 1997a; Streeck 2006). The Vietnam 
War, the domestic upheavals in the US that accompanied it, and the end of the long era 
of benevolent US hegemony encouraged a new generation of social scientists, especially 
in Europe, to look for and explore possible alternatives to the standard American pat-
tern of modern democratic capitalism. The rise of “Euro-Communism” and the events 
of 1968 and 1969 revived a traditional view of political action as collective choice be-
tween competing “ideologies” and ways of life. Students of comparative politics began 
to consider institutional differences between the US and other countries no longer sim-
ply in terms of how far the latter still had to travel to catch up with the former. Similar 
developments occurred in other social sciences, assisted by rapidly improving access 
to foreign countries and fast-growing information-processing capacities making cross-
national comparative research much easier than in the past. 
Thus, in comparative industrial relations,14 collective bargaining institutions and shop 
floor representation regimes ceased to be looked at mainly in terms of how far they 
lagged behind the American standard, given the rapid decline of trade unionism in the 
13 See Kerr et al. (1960). This was the time when a sociologist and ex-socialist such as Daniel Bell 
could proclaim the “end of ideology” (1965), in line with an American president of the period, 
John F. Kennedy, who in 1962 announced that “what is at stake is not some grand warfare of 
rival ideologies … but the practical management of a modern economy. What we need is not la-
bels and clichés but more basic discussion of the sophisticated and technical questions involved 
in keeping a great economic machinery moving ahead … Technical answers, not political an-
swers, must be provided …” (Commencement Address at Yale University, as quoted by Reich 
2007: 58).
14 In many ways the last remnant of institutional economics in the United States, industrial rela-
tions was in fact typically housed in economics departments. In the immediate postwar era it 
was closely linked to the US government policy of the time to implant New Deal-like institu-
tions in the labor markets of defeated enemy countries, relying, for example, on the Internation-
al Labour Organisation (ILO). Well into the 1970s, the discipline produced highly sophisticated 
work on institutional development and diffusion, the economic effects of different institutions 
in different national contexts, and the methods of international comparison. See, among many 
others, Kassalow (1969). 
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US at a time of resurgence of organized labor in Europe (Crouch/Pizzorno 1978). In 
the study of electoral and party politics, the Scandinavian pattern of close cooperation 
between powerful trade unions and a strong Socialist Party, with the “power resources” 
this provided for a policy of encompassing social protection and economic redistri-
bution, cast doubt on the general desirability of the American model of, at the time, 
ideologically indistinct catch-all parties (Korpi 1983). Also, research on and theories of 
interest groups were profoundly changed by the recognition that American-style “plu-
ralist” lobbying was not the only way advanced industrial democracies could accom-
modate social collectivism and organized interests, and that “corporatist” arrangements 
– institutions that give organized groups political co-decision rights15– were not only 
compatible with liberal democracy but had the capacity to impart to it a normatively 
desirable bias in favor of social classes whose needs and interests might otherwise be 
pushed aside (Schmitter 1974; Schmitter/Lehmbruch 1979). Here, as elsewhere, the dis-
covery of structural variation made room for a discussion of normative and ideological 
alternatives to the postwar American “model” of advanced capitalism that had long 
been considered a universal norm.
The policy area in which institutional divergence between nation-states came to receive 
particular attention was incomes policy. In the 1970s, countries in which trade unions 
were recognized partners in national incomes policies seemed to be coping better with 
stagflation than the US and, in particular, Britain.16 Countries that, unlike these two, 
proved capable of engaging in “concertation” and “political exchange” consistently re-
ceived lower values on the “misery index” popular at the time, the sum of their rates of 
inflation and unemployment.17 Institutions and institutional differences thus seemed 
to matter a great deal for a country’s position on the increasingly popular and sophisti-
cated OECD league tables, and in fact it appears that this observation was one of the ma-
jor inspirations for the subsequent development of the historical-institutionalist school 
in political economy (Thelen 1999).18 At some point, even economists took notice of 
the apparent relationship between social institutions and economic performance as ob-
served by sociologists and political scientists, and introduced indices of corporatism in 
their own econometric equations (Bruno/Sachs 1985). In politics, it was then, in 1976, 
that Helmut Schmidt ran a successful election campaign on the slogan “The German 
Model,” (Modell Deutschland) implicitly claiming economic and normative superiority 
for a society able and willing to integrate strong trade unions in public policy-making 
through institutionalized sharing of power and responsibility.19 
15 On the distinction between pluralism and corporatism, see Schmitter (1974).
16 Among many others, see Cameron (1984) and, recently, Streeck and Kenworthy (2005).
17 Invented by the economist Arthur Okun in 1965, under the name “discomfort index.”
18 “Historical“ because and to the extent that institutions figure as less than fully pliable legacies 
from the past entailing specific opportunities and constraints for actors at present, rather than 
as “rationally” designed instruments easily adjustable to changing collective or individual pur-
poses. For more on this, see below.
19 There is reason to believe that this was a euphemistic misrepresentation of a relationship that 
even at this time was, in fact, much more complicated (Streeck 2009: 108–119). In any case, the 
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By the 1980s, convergence theories had almost entirely fallen into disrepute in the social 
sciences outside of economics proper. Studies abounded that extolled not just the dis-
tinctiveness, but also the equivalence – if not superiority – of non-Anglo-American pat-
terns of social and economic organization, patterns that were more politically governed 
and socially embedded. An important influence was a British journalist working for The 
Economist, Andrew Shonfield, who, in a magisterial study on “modern capitalism” in the 
1960s, had, in the spirit of the age, described what he saw as an ongoing shift of power 
from private capitalism to interventionist nation-states and their – highly diverse – plan-
ning regimes (Shonfield 1965). While the book was rather descriptive and atheoretical, 
very much in the manner of the Historical School, it highlighted in detail the enormous 
variation in the institutional arrangements devised by different countries to impose or-
der and stability on their capitalist economies.20 Increasingly, Japan also came into view. 
Ronald Dore, author of the classic British Factory, Japanese Factory (1973), became a 
leading member of the Andrew Shonfield Society, which was founded after Shonfield’s 
early death in 1981 to continue making his case against market-liberal convergence and 
for the viability and indeed superiority of more communitarian forms of capitalism.21
While not avoiding normative argument, most of the institutionalist political economy 
literature of the time – a period of widely perceived Anglo-American decline – em-
phasized the, from a standard economics perspective, surprisingly good macro-eco-
nomic performance of non-standard versions of capitalism. The practical conclusion 
this seemed to suggest was that if Anglo-American economies wanted to recover from 
their “crisis,” they required major social reform, in the sense of redistributive interven-
tion to mitigate inequality; more public investment in training; better social protection 
and so on – in other words, the opposite of the further marketization and competitive 
deregulation prescribed by the rising movement of neoliberalism. Ronald Dore, in a 
much-cited book entitled Flexible Rigidities (1986), pointed out that it was precisely the 
reliance of the Japanese on “relational contracting” based on mutual trust – on close 
long-term relations between employers and workers, as well as between manufacturers 
and their suppliers – that had enabled the Japanese textile industry to prosper in hard 
times.22 Similarly, Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, in The Second Industrial Divide (Pi-
1976 election was the moment when the idea of a distinctively German – and by extension, Eu-
ropean – production model ceased to be taboo in postwar public discourse.
20 Later, Shonfield took a lively interest in Continental corporatism and worker participation, as 
indicated by his posthumous book, In Defense of the Mixed Economy (1984).
21 The last product of the Shonfield Society was a collective volume, The Political Economy of Mod-
ern Capitalism, with the subtitle Mapping Convergence and Diversity (Crouch/Streeck 1997b). In 
addition to an introduction, it consisted of seven country chapters (on Japan, Germany, Sweden, 
France, Italy, the UK, and the US) and four analytical chapters. At least two of the latter – by 
Philip Cerny and Susan Strange – were less than optimistic about the persistence of capitalist 
diversity, especially in the face of a rapidly internationalizing financial system.  
22 See also the influential book by Masahiko Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the 
Japanese Economy (1988), as well as the large number of articles on industrial relations during 
the 1980s that claimed functional equivalence for “flexibility” in internal as distinguished from 
external labor markets (among many, Streeck 1987).
14 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /12
ore/Sabel 1984), argued for the historical possibility of a new, post-Fordist production 
pattern, called “flexible specialization,” that was founded on community-like social re-
lations rather than on market pressures or bureaucratic factory authority. Their favorite 
examples were the “industrial districts” of Northern Italy. 
In the same vein, retracing the improbable rise of the apparently so institutionally “rigid” 
German economy to industrial preeminence in Europe and beyond during the 1970s 
and 1980s, Sorge and Streeck (1988) identified a “typically German” category of indus-
trial output, which they called “diversified quality production,” that was obviously high-
ly competitive in increasingly saturated global markets. Their point was that diversified 
quality production was not just compatible with but in fact favored and supported by 
a “virtuous circle” of mutually reinforcing “deviant” features of the German version of 
capitalism, such as strong trade unions, institutionalized worker participation on the 
shop floor and above, high wages with a low wage spread, high employer investment in 
workforce skills, and high employment security (Streeck 1991). What these authors and 
others had in common was that they were convinced of the possibility, sustainability, 
and even superiority of modes of production under capitalism that thrived on long-
term, community-based social commitments23 that, while humanly more acceptable, 
were also at least as efficient as traditional mass production, on the one hand, and the 
rising model of market-driven neoliberalism, on the other. 
In the United States, in particular, the possibility of alternative models of capitalism 
was held up, especially by opponents of neoliberal deregulation, as a genuinely Ameri-
can path to economic revitalization. Their idea was for the United States to learn from 
Europe and Japan, rather than vice versa. Emblematic in this respect was a book origi-
nating from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Made in America: Regaining the 
Productive Edge (Dertouzos et al. 1989). At the progressive end of the American political 
spectrum, more or less explicit preferences for an American version of Social Democra-
cy also played a role, not least among “Europeanists” in universities and think tanks who 
longed for examples of a successful capitalism softer and kinder than the American one. 
Well into the first years of the Clinton presidency, the institutional reforms the progres-
sive wing of the American public believed to be necessary for American capitalism to 
catch up with its Asian and Continental-European competitors were debated in terms 
of a distinction between a “high” and a “low road” toward industrial competitiveness. 
While the former was represented by Europe and Japan, the latter was identified with 
23 At the beginning of the 1990s, Dore and Streeck were planning to co-author a book on the supe-
rior productivity of “stickier,”  more lasting social commitments compared to more liquid ones, 
taking a preference for “liquidity” in labor and capital relations, and in social relations generally, 
to be typical of Anglo-America. Countries to be covered were Germany and Japan, on the one 
hand, and the US and the UK, on the other. The publication of Michel Albert’s book (see be-
low) and the reversal of economic fortunes between the two capitalist camps in the 1990s (with 
Japan entering its “lost decade,” Germany chafing under the burdens of welfare state expansion 
and reunification, and the United States and, to a lesser extent, Britain experiencing a new spell 
of prosperity) put an end to the project.
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the neoliberal deregulation project pursued by growing sections of American business 
since the mid-1970s. In an unprecedented critical self-examination, what was seen as 
American industrial decline was attributed to decades in neglect of areas such as educa-
tion, workforce training, industrial innovation, industrial policy, and industrial finance 
– areas in which countries less reliant on “free markets” excelled (Thurow 1992).
3 Capitalist variety and the neoliberal turn
By the early 1990s, all the core elements of what was to become the “varieties of capitalism” 
paradigm were in place and waiting to be assembled into a general framework for macro-
level political economy and economic sociology, beyond single-case country studies and 
the comparative analysis of select economic institutions such as collective bargaining. 
They included, in particular, the notion of national systems – or “models” – of differently 
institutionalized capitalisms locked in international competition; the rejection of con-
vergence in favor of lasting national diversity; the leading distinction between market-
liberal capitalisms located primarily in the Anglo-American world, and less-than-fully 
liberal, more relationally-based capitalisms like those, supposedly, in Europe and Japan; 
routine reliance on the comparative statistics published by international organizations 
on the macroeconomic performance and institutional structures of member states; the 
idea of differential “competitiveness” of national institutions, implying a responsibility 
on the part of national politics and government to establish and maintain the economi-
cally most beneficial institutions for their countries; the claim of the equal if not superior 
“competitiveness” of non-standard capitalisms and, as a consequence, of their sustain-
ability, even in a world of progressive globalization and increasing competitive pressures; 
the theme of a coincidence of moral and economic virtue in national economic systems, 
and of national political systems’ opportunity to choose a more humane alternative to 
Anglo-American standard capitalism; and a more or less explicit normative bias in favor 
of some sort of social-democratic or communitarian, welfare state-supported or other-
wise solidaristic “embedding” of the capitalist economy.
The project of a comparative study of capitalism in this vein received further momen-
tum from the breakdown of Soviet Communism and the final victory of capitalism over 
its historical opposition in 1989. While the events led an author such as Francis Fukuy-
ama to declare the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), students of political economy 
in the institutionalist tradition felt encouraged to devote even more attention to the 
differences, if no longer between capitalism and Communism, then between different 
national varieties of capitalism after it had become “the only game in town.” In fact, it 
was in the 1990s, after the demise of Communism, that the concept of capitalism gained 
universal currency as a more or less value-free analytical description outside of the or-
thodox Left and the ultra-liberal Right.
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /12
There were also several adverse developments in the real world which, however, failed to 
derail the project. One was certainly the embarrassing fascination of the countries of the 
former Soviet Bloc with the “American model” and the enthrallment of their new elites 
with neoliberal prescriptions of “shock therapy.” Moreover, there had for some time been 
suspicions that the US was using its growing international power to bend the rules of 
global capitalist competition in favor of its own, “low-road” regime, so as to spare itself 
the effort of reform in the direction of a capitalism with a more human face. A frequently 
cited example was the so-called Structural Impediments Initiative launched in 1989 by 
the Bush I administration in relation to Japan, which was aimed at forcing the Japanese 
government to free up markets – including capital markets – based on the American 
model.24 In Europe, the fear of a less deserving, socially destructive capitalism on the 
brink of prevailing over its better alternative was forcefully articulated by the French 
author, Michel Albert. His Capitalism against Capitalism (Albert [1991]1993), written 
for a popular audience and translated into all major languages, divided the world into 
two camps: the Rhineland, led by Germany and Japan, and Anglo-America, with France 
sitting on the fence.25 Anticipating and indeed defining some of the core themes of the 
“varieties of capitalism” literature, Albert arrived at the melancholy conclusion that the 
greater dynamism and cultural attraction of American-style neoliberal adventure capi-
talism – what he called the “neo-American model” – was about to crowd out the more 
solidaristic and ultimately more efficient capitalism of the combined Rhinelands.
Another inauspicious development – and easily the most important – was the retreat 
of the Clinton administration in the middle of its first term from its original pretense 
at social reform as a strategy of economic revitalization. The 1990s saw the astonish-
ing success of the less demanding policy of deregulation and financialization that was 
chosen instead and that actually did usher in more than a decade of unprecedented if 
– as we now know, after the bubble has burst – artificial prosperity (Stiglitz 2003). Soon 
Britain under Blair was to follow the lead of Clinton and Bush II, reinforcing percep-
tions of Anglo-American parallelism. Simultaneously, the British and American “Euro-
sclerosis” rhetoric, which had been around, if mostly in the form of wishful thinking, 
since the early 1980s, seemed finally to come into its own, with the mounting employ-
ment and fiscal crises of leading Continental-European welfare states and their desper-
ate search for more “flexibility” in their labor markets and social security systems. There 
was also the rapid internationalization of the capitalist economy, popularly known as 
“globalization,” which potentially conflicted with the theoretical commitment of com-
parative capitalism research to the nation-state as its basic unit of comparison, pro-
24 The event inspired the collective volume, National Diversity and Global Capitalism, edited by 
Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore (1996).
25 Michel Albert was not a professional scholar but an insurance industry executive-cum-public 
intellectual who had worked in both worlds: Germany and Switzerland, as well as the US. He 
had several other books to his credit when he published Capitalism Against Capitalism. Among 
the most interesting chapters of the latter work is the one comparing insurance practices in 
Switzerland (the “Alpine” model) and the UK (the “maritime” model, Chapter 5). 
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ducing mounting evidence of the obsolescence of a conceptual toolkit that disregards 
interdependence for the sake of comparability.
While the rise of neoliberalism in the 1990s did not stand in the way of the beginning 
“varieties of capitalism” debate, it did result in the optimistic beliefs of the previous 
decade in the economic superiority of the normatively favored alternative to standard 
capitalism being more or less silently abandoned. Increasingly it seemed unavoidable to 
concede to the Anglo-American “model” the same stability and sustainability that had 
been attributed to the more socially embedded capitalisms, perhaps in the hope that the 
opponents of the latter would reciprocate and in turn recognize the embattled Europe-
an and Japanese “models” as coequal. As for the accelerating liberalization of the Con-
tinental and Asian “nonliberal” capitalism (Yamamura/Streeck 2003), this tended to be 
considered essentially as an opportunistic adjustment that was far from transformative 
(Vogel 2003). Concerning the United States and, to a lesser extent, Britain, questions 
such as how they would in the longer run service their rapidly growing private debt and 
pay for a level of consumption that had become increasingly detached from production 
and productivity were never asked. The same applies to the causes and consequences of 
the endemic US trade deficit that was soon to be complemented by, again, rapidly rising 
government deficits. It was only when financialized capitalism collapsed in the crisis of 
2008 that the fundamental deficiencies and lack of sustainability of debt-financed neo-
liberal prosperity came into the view of comparative capitalism research and theory.
4 Varieties of capitalism, varieties of approaches26
Why should national “capitalisms” become and remain different, despite powerful pres-
sures for cross-national convergence emanating from the diffusion of technologies, in-
ternational competition, border-crossing markets, transnational firms, international 
organizations, an increasingly global culture, and the like? Four models of capitalist 
variety – in other words, accounts of what kinds of social forces result in it – can ide-
ally be distinguished in the existing literature, although they sometimes overlap: (1) a 
social embeddedness model, (2) a power resource model, (3) a historical-institutionalist 
model, and (4) a rationalist-functionalist model (for a synopsis, see Table 1). While the 
first three are seen as superior to standard capitalism but vulnerable to its advance, the 
fourth is claimed to be equivalent to it and equally sustainable.
(1) The social embeddedness account of capitalist variety grounds the persistence of cap-
italist diversity in societies’ cultural traditions and formal and informal social structures 
or networks. It is the most sociological of the four models. Societies are distinguished 
by the extent to which traditional, pre-capitalist codes of social behavior and modes 
26 This is the title of a collection of essays edited by David Coates (2005b).
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of social control continue even under capitalism to moderate the egoistic pursuit of 
economic interests.27 In societies in which this is more the case than in others – where, 
in other words, the social and economic order is based on effective normative integra-
tion – economic transactions are to a lesser extent than in more “modern” societies 
exempt from the standards of appropriateness that govern social transactions generally. 
The dominant values, in economic life as well as in social life in general, are reciprocity, 
group solidarity, discipline, respect for traditional status, group identification, accep-
tance of paternalistic responsibility in return for deference to authority, and the like 
(Dore [1983]1992). Modern organizations in socially embedded capitalism are cultur-
ally styled in terms of extended families or villages, with prevailing role definitions em-
phasizing particularism, ascription, functional diffuseness, affectivity, and collectivity 
orientation.28 Economic performance is primarily the performance of social duties, and 
profit is not central but ensues as a result of faithful adherence to the normative order. 
Status counts more than class, honor more than income, and traditions – of workman-
27 The model is closely related to the “societal effect” theory of economic organization, where 
traditional status orders, or long-lasting meta-traditions of social organization, condition the 
organization of work and industry at the point of production (Maurice et al. 1980; Sorge 2005). 
The difference is that the societal effect literature treats each country as a historical individual 
and refrains from developing a typology.
28 These are, of course, the opposites of the “modern” end of Talcott Parsons’ five “pattern vari-
ables”: universalism, achievement, functional specificity, affective neutrality, and self-orienta-
tion (Parsons 1951: 67). 
Table 1 Four models of capitalist variety
The rationalist-
functionalist  
model
Economic 
Efficiency-
maximizing elites
Consensual pursuit 
of efficiency 
Specialization 
as conditioned 
by institutional 
capacities
Different 
institutional 
capacities 
Miscalculation 
of interests and 
capacities
The historical-
institutionalist 
model
Institutional 
Organized  
interests 
Path-dependent 
institution-building
Labor-accommo-
dating production 
strategies (“diver-
sified quality 
production”)
Institutional 
constraints and 
opportunities
Concertation
Economic 
liberalization 
The power  
resource model
Political
Organized labor 
Politics and 
legislation
Equality and  
security
Government 
economic policy
Political 
disorganization 
The social  
embeddedness 
model
Social-structural 
and cultural 
Social and  
cultural elites
Tradition
Long-term 
profitability
Normative social 
integration, 
strong network 
ties
Cultural 
modernization
Source of variety 
Hegemonic actors 
Source of economic 
order
Distinctive economic 
performance 
Source of economic 
performance
Source of possible 
convergence 
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ship or social decency – matter more than material benefits. The model country for 
socially embedded capitalism is, of course, Japan.29 
Despite their social traditionalism, and indeed because of it, capitalist systems based on 
social integration as opposed to economic incentives may perform very well economi-
cally, and at least sometimes better than more “modern” capitalisms. This is because 
cultural traditionalism happens to support long-term social relations that, as a wel-
come side-effect, sustain long-term economic relations, with the ensuing mutual trust 
being at least as economically beneficial as the individual incentives that come with 
high, market-generated inequality.30 Typically, accounts of the economic benefits of 
cultural traditionalism, or backwardness, carry with them a concern about their con-
tinued viability in the modern world. The question is whether the social and political 
elites that serve as guardians of inherited conventions will be able to defend traditional-
ist action orientations against the temptations of short-term satisfaction, consumerism, 
and individualism.31 As mentioned above, the notion of modernization undermining 
normative integration and thereby eroding the economic performance of alternative 
versions of capitalism is a central theme of Michel Albert ([1991]1993), but it is also 
present in more recent work of Ronald Dore (2000, Chapter 11) and others. That mod-
ern society may consume its normative foundations without being able to restore them 
is, of course, an old theme of social theory prominent in the works of writers as differ-
ent as Daniel Bell (1976) and Jürgen Habermas (1973, 1975).
(2) The power resource model, of which the exemplary case is Sweden, as presented 
particularly in the work of Walter Korpi,32 is politically rather than culturally or so-
cial-structurally based. Non-capitalist social solidarity figures prominently in politi-
cal-economic relations, but rather than being a residual of precapitalist traditions, it 
is constructed by collective political action and redistributive politics. In other words, 
traditional institutions, which were weakened in the course of capitalist market expan-
sion, are replaced by social-democratic social policy. De-commodification, or protec-
tion from commodification in the first place, is achieved not through normatively in-
29 But there are also culturalist-communitarian accounts of capitalism in Italy, the locus classicus 
being the work of Sebastiano Brusco (1982). Alternative interpretations of Italian industrial 
districts emphasize their dependence on a specific institutional “exoskeleton” (Piore/Sabel 1984; 
Trigilia/Burroni 2009). The story they tell is either historical-institutionalist or rationalist-func-
tionalist, and sometimes both at the same time, depending on the degree to which institutions 
are described as inherited or rationally constructed for economic purposes.
30 Network-like social ties also figure prominently in the earlier literature on “social systems of 
production” (Hollingsworth/Boyer 1997), “national systems of innovation” (Lundvall 1992), 
and “business systems” (Whitley 1999), which both preceded and significantly informed the 
varieties of capitalism debate. The general idea in this literature is that different societies have 
different ways of establishing links between agents engaged in production, innovation, and 
business relations, resulting in different kinds and, perhaps, levels of economic performance.
31 It is the task of policy, then, to cultivate the social ties that keep the economy running. The more 
emphasis is placed on the need for political intervention to stabilize the social system underly-
ing the capitalist economy, the closer one gets to the rationalist-functionalist model. See below.
32 See Korpi (1978, 1983). See also Martin (1984) and Pontusson (1992), among others. 
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tegrated informal networks, but through the application of legislative state power as 
a functional alternative to and modern substitute for social traditionalism. The main 
agent of social-democratic “politics against markets” (Esping-Andersen 1985) is the 
labor movement with its two wings, a unified socialist party and an encompassing trade 
union confederation, working together – also in coalition with other social forces – to 
acquire and maintain control of the democratic state as the modern “power resource” 
of the broad mass of the people. Capitalist firms are used, and the laws of the market 
are judiciously observed, in order to generate general prosperity. Simultaneously, social 
policy, especially labor market policy, is deployed to distribute the results of the collec-
tive effort in as egalitarian a manner as possible and to contain the uncertainties that 
would emerge from an unfettered free market economy. 
Socially controlled capitalism, or democratic socialism, as envisaged by the power re-
source model of capitalist diversity probably comes closest to what Karl Polanyi meant 
by the “great transformation” he expected to take place after World War II and the ca-
tastrophe of liberalism in the first half of the twentieth century (Polanyi [1944]1957). 
The principal condition of its persistence in the face of pressures for convergence on a 
market-driven and de-politicized standard capitalism is that the collective organiza-
tions of the working class succeed in keeping their constituents mobilized, in principle 
indefinitely. In particular, they must manage to secure broad popular adherence to the 
political goals of an egalitarian distribution of life chances and of public protection for 
all members of the community from the vagaries of capitalist markets, especially mar-
kets for labor and capital. As recent Swedish experience shows, disorganization of the 
Left, or of the political system generally, disperses the power resources of those whose 
interests depend on effective containment and control of markets, eventually moving 
the political economy closer to the capitalist mainstream.
(3) The historical-institutionalist model, by comparison, emphasizes the role of inher-
ited institutions as both constraints and opportunities for economic action. Institutions 
are conceived, not primarily as normative scripts or tacit cultural understandings, but 
as collectively sanctioned, mostly formalized building blocks of social order, including 
economic order.33 Rather than the result of rational calculation or voluntary agree-
ment, institutions are seen in principle as historical legacies that are sticky, i.e., not easy 
to change, or likely to change mostly along an established path (Thelen 1999; Pierson/
Skocpol 2002). Moreover, they entail obligations, not just rights, and while they may 
serve rational-economic objectives, they also serve a wide range of further purposes. 
Economic institutions therefore also have to satisfy expectations beyond economic ones, 
and economic action is governed not just by economic institutions in a narrow sense 
but also by social institutions.
33 On different concepts of institution, and the respective variants of institutional theory, see Hall 
and Taylor (1996).
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In historical-institutionalist work, institutions that regulate and accommodate collec-
tive interests and collective organization at the intermediate level of society between the 
market and the state are especially important for capitalist variety. Intermediate institu-
tions of this kind were at the center of theories of corporatism (Schmitter 1974) which 
contributed significantly to the emerging research program of historical institutional-
ism (see Streeck 2006). In this perspective, capitalist variety is vested in the way in which 
the interests of social groups and the organizations that represent them are included in 
political and economic decision-making, at both the micro and the macro level. What 
is particularly important is the extent to which intermediary institutions are labor-in-
clusive, allowing non-capitalist interests to insert themselves in the governance of the 
capitalist political economy, for example through tripartite negotiations with the state 
and capital. Obviously, the principal example for the model is Germany (Streeck 1997). 
In historical-institutionalist accounts, capitalist diversity is brought about and sustained 
not just by political democracy and redistributive government intervention, but also by 
the way in which labor is institutionalized as a countervailing power in the organiza-
tion of production. The underlying assumption is that productive cooperation between 
capital and labor takes different forms and produces different results depending on how 
labor is organized and included. Whether or not negotiated production systems prove 
“competitive” in the market depends on conjunctural circumstances – that is, on good 
luck – as well as on whether capitalists and their managements learn to live with the ob-
ligations they have to accept as the price of labor’s cooperation. Capitalist “economizing” 
takes place only against the background of institutionalized restrictions imposed on it 
in the name of objectives other than the maximization of profit. Leading assumptions 
are that there are different ways for capitalist firms to make a profit; that some ways, like 
diversified quality production (Streeck 1991), are more demanding although not neces-
sarily less profitable for capital than others; that labor and society at large may have a 
preference for the more difficult production strategies (“the high road”) being adopted 
by firms; that which strategy is in fact adopted is affected in part by the institutional-
ized power of labor as well as the willingness of firms to live with what may for them 
be a second-best alternative; and that the ultimate arbiter for the path taken by a social 
system of production under capitalism is whether it can find a market for its products. 
Moreover, whether or not capital is willing to “learn” and explore alternative, more 
labor-accommodating production and marketing strategies is significantly affected by 
available opportunities to exit from a regime under which labor has the capacity to im-
pose obligations on capital (Streeck 2009, Chapter 13). The main source of convergence 
in the historical-institutionalist model, therefore, is economic liberalization and the 
opportunities for international mobility it offers (Streeck 2004a).
(4) Finally, the rationalist-functionalist model explains capitalist variety as the outcome 
of a search for economic advantage. Its background is the shift of the convergence dis-
course in the neoliberal 1980s and 1990s from technological to economic determinism: 
that is, to the idea that increased international competition as brought about by “glo-
balization” will force national economic systems to converge on a unified “best practice.” 
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While sharing the neoliberal – or economistic – view of the social order as an economic 
order, rather than the other way around,34 the rationalist-functionalist model arrives at 
the opposite conclusion: it suggests that, in an integrated world economy, institutional 
differences may not only be not obsolete but in fact desirable as they may enable na-
tional or local economies to specialize in particular products and processes and thereby 
establish a comparative advantage. Far from generating identical institutions, in other 
words, competition is seen as giving rise to institutional diversity by exerting pressures 
for specialization.35
The rationalist-functionalist model differs from the social embeddedness and the his-
torical-institutionalist models in that it treats the economic benefits of institutional 
non-conformity not as its more or less unintended effects but as its cause, or raison d’être. 
Institutions do not just enable successful economic performance, but they are built for 
the purpose and would be re-built if they ceased doing so. In the social embeddedness 
model, competitiveness comes about as a side-effect of adherence to community norms, 
while in the historical-institutionalist model it results from capitalists learning to live 
with and make the best of a firmly institutionalized labor constraint. The rationalist-
functionalist model, by comparison, considers competitive efficiency as the intended 
goal of a cooperative economizing community of transaction cost-conscious actors 
consensually seeking the most efficient ways of organizing their mutual relations;36 in 
particular, cooperation is not seen as conditional on capitalists meeting non-economic 
social obligations. 
In the rationalist-functionalist model, to sum up, capitalist variety in institutional struc-
tures and public policies is causally explained and normatively evaluated by its functions 
for economic efficiency. That a country’s institutions and policies enhance economic 
performance is assured by hegemonic political-economic actors conceived as rational 
economizers concerned with minimizing transaction costs. Economic institutions have 
34 The social embeddedness model views the economic order as a social order, while the power 
resource and historical-institutionalist models describe it as social-political order. 
35 This is a theme well known to sociologists (Durkheim [1893]1964). It is taken up by Hall and 
Soskice with reference to economic theories of comparative advantage (Hall/Soskice 2001a: 36 f.), 
as originating with David Ricardo and further developed by Paul Krugman (1991). Their point 
is that trade theory has increasingly recognized the importance of institutions (as distinguished 
from factor endowments) as sources of comparative advantage, but has as yet been unable to find 
a systematic link between the nature of national institutions and the kinds of products in which 
national economies excel. Still, there is much similarity between their argument and that of an 
author such as Michael Porter, in his Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990).
36 In other words, it explains community norms in a reductionist manner, by conceiving of them 
as rationally designed to be economically efficient, or selected by an efficient market for institu-
tions. The boundary between economistic-reductionist and cultural or historical-institutional-
ist accounts is, however, sometimes blurred. See the famous article by Williamson and Ouchi 
(1981), which wavers between rationalist and culturalist perspectives on transaction cost-min-
imizing social norms. Rational choice reconstructions of cultural integration in capitalism are 
frequent, both in the German and the Japanese case.
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only one function, to increase efficiency, which makes them easy to design and redesign, 
and enables the theory of capitalist variety to be functionalist and voluntaristic-ratio-
nalist at the same time.37 Institution-builders are modeled as rationally interested in 
preserving the distinctiveness of their country’s institutional arrangements, unless they 
make the mistake of listening to the advice of neoliberal prophets of the “one best way.” 
The rational design capacities of economic and political actors are complemented by 
effective selection in competitive markets for institutions, where institutions survive to 
the extent that they enjoy comparative advantage. The functionalist nature of the model 
is also reflected in its relegation of distributional concerns to secondary status. 
5 Institutional complementarity and comparative advantage 
By the late 1990s, capitalist diversity had become the subject of a broad literature, cul-
minating in a number of widely read books (for example, Stallings 1995; Berger/Dore 
1996; Crouch/Streeck 1997b; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Coates 2000). However, the most in-
fluential formulation of the theme was presented in a collective volume edited by Peter 
Hall and David Soskice in 2001, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (2001b). While individual chapters differed somewhat in their 
approach, the book’s introduction (Hall/Soskice 2001a) developed a conceptual model 
of capitalist variety that was straightforwardly rationalist-functionalist. Although the 
model was not consistently applied, not even at the point of its invention, and was later 
occasionally fudged to accommodate historical-institutionalist critiques,38 it became 
the founding document for a veritable growth industry in political science and political 
economy in particular (Figure 1).
Both the model and its reception are, again, best understood in a sociology-of-knowl-
edge perspective. While politically the model reflects the ascendency at the time of its 
inception of Anglo-American finance-led capitalism – whose fundamental unsustain-
ability had yet to be revealed – academically it spoke the language of the rational choice 
institutionalism that was then rising to dominance almost everywhere: a language that 
lent itself to being presented and received as so much more “rigorous” and “theoretical” 
than that of competing models of capitalist diversity.39 Couched in those terms, and 
37 To the extent that cost-saving social ties are described as only partly constructed and ultimately 
culture-based, the rationalist-functionalist model shades into the social embeddedness one.
38 See Hall and Thelen (2009) or Hall (2007). Concessions to critics of efficiency-theoretical ac-
counts of socioeconomic institutions went, however, mostly unnoticed by subsequent users, 
probably because they were never integrated by the authors of the model into its core concep-
tual structure.
39 Hall and Soskice draw extensively on the conceptual apparatus of transaction cost economics, 
referred to as the “new micro-economics” or the “new economics of organization” (Hall/Soskice 
2001a: 5; 14).
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against the background of the apparent turnaround of the Anglo-American economy, 
Hall and Soskice delivered their message that alternative, “European” versions of capi-
talism were not doomed to converge on the neoliberal, American model, and that this 
could be demonstrated even in the much-admired language spoken at leading econom-
ics departments, thereby making that language finally available even to those unwill-
ing to buy into the “best practice” universalism of neoliberal economics. What further 
endeared their approach to a wide readership seems to have been its dichotomous and 
perhaps Manichaean division of the world into two warring camps, like the one that 
had already boosted Michel Albert’s book ([1991]1993).
Given the enormous impact of the 2001 essay, it seems appropriate to take a closer 
look at some of its main tenets, including the conceptual weaknesses associated with its 
rationalist-functionalist orientation:
(1) National capitalist systems, referred to as “market economies,” are said to come in 
two types, “liberal” and “coordinated, ” the former (abbreviated “LMEs”) comprising six 
countries from the Anglo-American family of nations, the latter (the “CMEs”) includ-
ing Germany and its smaller neighbors (the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and 
Austria), Scandinavia and Japan. Occasionally, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
and Turkey are classified as “ambiguous” or, alternatively, as constituting a third, “Medi-
terranean,” type; for the conceptual framework this remains however largely irrelevant. 
Germany is the paradigmatic case of a “CME.” In the Introduction, its contrasting case 
is the United States. Of the 13 empirical chapters, however, the US appears only in 
four. In six chapters, LMEs are represented by the UK, in three of them in a direct two-
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country comparison with Germany, which in turn features in no less than 10 of the 11 
chapters that consider individual cases.
(2) LMEs and CMEs are alleged to differ in the way the firms that operate in them secure 
the “cooperation” they need for efficient production. Partners with which firms have to 
“coordinate” include suppliers, workers, creditors, shareholders, customers, trade unions, 
governments, and others (Hall/Soskice 2001a: 6). The authors describe their approach 
as “firm-centered” (ibid.: 5) and “relational” (ibid.: 6), which they consider to be its 
distinguishing characteristics. Relations of production are described as either “arm’s-
length,” as in the so-called LMEs where they are arranged through formal contracts and 
competitive markets, or “relational,” as in the CMEs, where they are established through 
strategic interaction and coordination.40
(3) National models of capitalism are controlled by firms in search of efficient rela-
tions of production. The problems firms must solve are conceived as those identified 
by transaction cost economics and rational choice institutionalism: avoiding hold-ups 
and moral hazard, containing opportunism, eliminating uncertainty, cultivating trust, 
preventing shirking and adverse selection, and generally minimizing transaction costs. 
Institutional structures in either system are solutions, established by firms or, on their 
behalf, by national states, to problems of efficient governance of economic transactions. 
Political intervention serves to optimize the institutional framework within which firms 
pursue their respective competitive strategies. This includes institutions such as labor 
market regulation or the welfare state. With firms as the main agents of institution-
building and institutional change, the theory is revisionist with regard to the role of 
trade unions and labor parties: rather than as countervailing powers, as in the power 
resource model, they appear as cross-class coalition partners of strategically competent 
firms with which they share a general interest in competitive efficiency.41
40 Conceptual confusion is rampant here. “Coordination” sometimes refers to the establishment 
of productive relations in general, regardless of whether through markets or – other? – institu-
tions. Mostly, however, the term is used synonymous with “non-market coordination”; hence 
the distinction between “coordinated” and “liberal” market economies. Also, while markets are 
sometimes included in institutions, mostly institutions mean only non-market institutions. 
And while in some places all interaction between economic actors seems to be “strategic,” when 
it comes to distinguishing the two main types, strategic interaction is confined to CMEs (Hall/
Soskice 2001a: 8). Similarly, the authors designate their approach as “relational” on the grounds 
that it models political economy in game-theoretical terms, only to limit the concept later to the 
coordinated type of market economy. Moreover, although game theory is prominently invoked 
in the conceptual part of the chapter, and is claimed to be distinctive of the approach (ibid.: 5), 
it plays no role in the substantive sections.
41 For empirical reference the argument draws on the work of Swenson, Mares, and others who in 
the 1990s redefined welfare state development as an outgrowth of a strategic search by capital 
for higher returns on investment, rather than the result of pressure from labor for redistribu-
tion and protection from market forces (Swenson 1991, 1997; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Mares 
2001, 2003; Swenson 2001).
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(4) LMEs and CMEs differ in their economic capabilities as vested in their differing 
endowments with institutions and resources. While different, however, the capabilities 
of liberal and coordinated market economies are also equal, in the sense of equally com-
petitive and sustainable.42 This is because each of the two types comes with a different 
“comparative advantage.” LMEs and CMEs show similar levels of economic growth, per 
capita income, and unemployment43 which, however, they achieve in different ways. 
Whereas German-type economies excel at “incremental” innovation resulting in “diver-
sified quality production,” Anglo-American economies are alleged to be better at “radi-
cal” innovation, with the respective innovation patterns related to different patterns of 
“coordination” between economic actors (Hall/Soskice 2001a: 21–44). 
(5) National political economies are composed of institutional spheres that function 
better the more they “complement” one another. Five such spheres are envisaged: in-
dustrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm 
relations, and the relationship between workers and management (Hall/Soskice 2001a: 
6f.), although the list keeps changing. Institutions are considered complementary “if 
the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the 
other” (2001a: 17).44 The claim is “that nations with a particular type of coordination 
in one sphere of the economy should tend to develop complementary practices in other 
spheres as well” (ibid.: 18). Although the meaning is not entirely clear, it seems that 
complementarity is defined as structural homogeneity (or isomorphism): coordina-
tion via institutions other than markets – that is, through strategic interaction in the 
narrower sense – is to be more efficient in one sphere if the same sort of coordination 
is also practiced in other spheres. National institutional configurations are likely to be 
structurally homogeneous, and in this sense complementary, because of their gover-
nors’ desire to increase their efficiency. 
(6) Together, the equal competitiveness of LMEs and CMEs and the economic benefits 
of complementarity stand in the way of convergence on a single “best practice” of na-
tional capitalisms. Both types are capable of survival, their chances being greater the 
purer their adherence to their respective method of “coordination” across institutional 
spheres. This makes radical institutional change rare. While a deviant development in 
42 “Although each type of capitalism has its partisans, we are not arguing here that one is superior 
to another” (Hall/Soskice 2001a: 21). 
43 “Performance” does not include distribution, which is treated as a separate matter (Hall/Sos-
kice 2001a: 21).  The typical patterns of distribution associated with the two capitalisms are not 
included among their typological characteristics. Institutional analysis is only about efficiency 
defined as “the net return to the use of an institution given its costs” (ibid.: 17). A typical claim 
is that since economic actors in CMEs “rely more heavily on forms of coordination secured 
through strategic interaction…, the relevant institutions will be those that allow them to co-
ordinate on equilibrium strategies that offer higher returns to all concerned (ibid.: 9f.; italics 
added).
44 “We refer to total returns, leaving aside the question of to whom they accrue,” which is “a matter 
of property rights” (Hall/Soskice 2001a: 17, FN 17). The latter are obviously considered to be 
irrelevant for capitalist institutional variety as different patterns of distribution.
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one sphere is likely to be reined in by economic pressures for efficiency-through-com-
plementarity, simultaneous change in all sectors in the same direction is difficult if not 
impossible to bring about.45 (Note that this deals a poor hand to oppositional forces 
in either system that would like their country to switch to the alternative system – to 
neoliberals in Germany-at-large, just as to social reformers in Greater Anglo-America.) 
Rather than convergence, the tendency is for polarization: for countries with impure 
combinations of institutions to move from their position somewhere between the two 
“ideal” types to either of its two endpoints where institutional arrangements are homo-
geneous and, therefore, more efficient.
Ultimately, the functionalist make-up of the Hall and Soskice conceptual schema would 
seem to be most apparent in, and perhaps to derive from, the way it equates its main 
concept, “capitalism,” with that of “market economy.” The very problems of distribu-
tion and exploitation that are centrally emphasized when a socioeconomic formation is 
referred to as capitalist are thereby submerged in, or redefined as, problems of efficient 
production. As a consequence, the fundamental ambivalence inherent in the concept of 
capitalism as a system of both economic progress and private appropriation is elimi-
nated. Similarly, conflict and power are thrown out as sources of socioeconomic order 
in favor of coordination and cooperation. Reconceived as a market economy, capitalism 
becomes a political technology for cooperative wealth creation, where the pursuit of 
efficiency is identical with the pursuit of profit and where political conflict results, if at 
all, from misunderstandings and insufficient knowledge of economic “laws.” Thus the 
notion of capitalism, originally inseparably associated with conflict and crisis, becomes 
not just technocratically sterilized but also de-historicized, as the conceptual schema of 
capitalism-as-market-economy has no systematic place for the possibility of capitalism-
as-political-economy reaching historical limits to its sustainability. 
6 Not enough variety, too little history? The “VoC Debate”
In the following I will review central aspects of the extensive debate on the Hall and 
Soskice model of capitalist variety, referred to from here on as “VoC.” My review will 
focus on four critical issues:46 the methodological nationalism behind VoC’s definition 
of cases as countries, and the assignment of countries as whole units to positions in a ty-
pological classification of “capitalisms”; the functionalism behind the conceptualization 
of countries as tightly coupled interactive systems of “complementary” institutions; the 
45 For a brief discussion of the relationship between complementarity and change, see Hall and 
Soskice (2001a: 63f.).
46 For an excellent overview that appeared when the present paper was being written, see Bohle 
and Greskovits (2009). See also three collective volumes that reflect the breadth of the debate: 
Morgan/Whitley/Moen (2005), Hancké/Rhodes/Thatcher (2007a), and Hancké (2009).
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economism underlying accounts of social order as a result of adaptation to pressures for 
efficiency; and the static comparativism of an approach to capitalism that assigns only 
secondary significance to origin, history, agency, conflict, and change.
First, critics objected early on to the dualism, or bipolarity, of the Hall and Soskice 
typology, and to the way the two main types, “LMEs” and “CMEs,” were defined as op-
posite ends of a one-dimensional property space (Goodin 2003). As noted, Hall and 
Soskice mention in passing but fail to theorize a third category of capitalism, which they 
label “ambiguous” or “Mediterranean.”47 This leaves open the question of whether cases 
that do not fit either of the two principal types are located somewhere between them, 
with the prospect of evolving with time into one of the two (“dual convergence”), or 
whether they are something else, requiring a more complex typology, like the one sug-
gested by Boyer (2001), who distinguishes between market-led, corporate, social-dem-
ocratic, and state-led capitalisms. Amable (2003), using factor-analytical econometric 
techniques on a large set of macroeconomic variables, establishes five types, which he 
calls market-based, Asian, Continental-European, Social-Democratic, and Mediterra-
nean. In contrast, Coates distinguishes between market-led, negotiated-consensual, and 
developmental state-led capitalism (1999), or between liberal and trust-based capital-
ism (2000). Still other classifications are offered by Schmidt, who in order to accom-
modate the peculiarities of the French political economy proposes three types, market 
capitalism, managed capitalism, and state capitalism (2003), and by Hancké, Rhodes 
and Thatcher (2007b: 25).48
Another, more specific objection to the bipolar typology of Hall and Soskice relates to 
the way it lumps together the United States and the United Kingdom as the two paradig-
matic “LMEs.” For a major difference between the two, with high typological relevance, 
several authors point to the strong role of the American state in technological innova-
tion, especially through military spending, without which Silicon Valley or the internet 
would never have come into being (see, among many others, Crouch 2005a: 134f.; Taylor 
2009). Moreover, and more fundamentally, Crouch (2005a) argues that Hall and Soskice 
confuse cases and types, a mistake of which Max Weber had already warned (ibid.: 57).
Empirical cases must be studied, not to determine to which (singular) of a number of theoreti-
cal types they should each be allocated, but to determine which (plural) of these types are to be 
found within them, in roughly what proportions, and with what change over time.
(Crouch 2005a: 26)
47 Schneider and Soskice (2009), in order to accommodate Latin America, add “hierarchical” to 
“coordinated” and “liberal” market economies. 
48 There is also a broad literature trying to fit the political economies of Eastern Europe after the 
transition into a, usually expanded, typology of national capitalisms (see, for example, David 
Lane 2005; Feldman 2007; King 2007; Lane/Myant 2007; Mykhnenko 2007; Bohle/Greskovits 
2009; Nölke/Vliegenthart 2009). If anything, the apparently unending number of alternative 
typologies serves to reinforce skepticism about the validity of any general typology of different 
“capitalisms.”
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Ultimately, this raises the issue of the nature of the cases compared. As noted, in stan-
dard comparative capitalism cases are countries, or societies organized as nation-states. 
But if what is compared are really types of coordination, or modes of governance, sub-
national regions (Trigilia/Burroni 2009) and sectors (Hollingsworth et al. 1994) might 
also qualify as cases, while countries would better be conceived as combinations of 
more or less heterogeneous institutions (Crouch et al. 2009). In general, as the number 
of types of capitalism grows, and that of countries within types consequently declines, 
countries begin to appear increasingly as “historical individuals” in a Weberian sense. 
Paradoxically, this makes their commonality as capitalist political economies and their 
mutual interrelations more salient.
The status of countries as principal units of comparison is also called into question 
by research on the behavior of firms. That firms are not the prisoners of nation-states, 
and today less so than ever, entails the possibility of institutional arbitrage, with firms 
moving their operations, or parts of them, to the environment that best fits their needs. 
While Hall and Soskice expect this to reinforce diversity between countries (2001a: 57), 
porous national borders seem to enable firms also to acquire needed resources from 
abroad, which would allow them to pursue deviant or atypical competitive strategies 
at their original location. As a consequence, diversity between firms within national 
systems may increase, causing in turn growing convergence among the latter. On the 
basis of research on the German, Italian, and British pharmaceutical industries, Herr-
mann (2008a) argues for the possibility of radical innovation in a “coordinated mar-
ket economy” such as Germany, as firms can procure from abroad production inputs 
not supplied under domestic institutional regimes.49 More generally, several authors 
doubt the capacity of national institutional contexts to control the strategic behavior 
of firms as tightly as implied by VoC (Hancké/Goyer 2005; Batt, Nohara/Kwon 2010; 
Doellgast 2010). Thus Wood et al. (2009) show important differences in firm-level labor 
relations practices within and not just between countries. Similarly, Morgan (Morgan 
2005, 2009) emphasizes an – apparently growing – strategic capacity of firms to make 
individual choices independent of national institutional constraints, thereby bringing 
about systemic change by increasing diversity within systems and simultaneously blur-
ring the differences between them.50
More questions regarding the power of national institutions to shape the behavior of 
firms are raised by an inspection of trade patterns. According to Watson, who warns 
of the danger of “reification” of “the national” in Ricardian theories of comparative 
advantage, there is no indication that, as the Hall and Soskice typology implies, “the 
greater the institutional difference between two countries the more distinct their pat-
49 See the extended debate between Herrmann (2008b, 2009, 2010), Lange (2009), and Casper 
(2009) in several issues of Socio-Economic Review on the competitive strategies and success of 
German firms in biotechnology, which goes back to Casper’s contribution to the Hall and Sos-
kice volume (Casper 2001).
50 See also, earlier, Katz and Darbishire (2000).
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terns of economic specialization will be” (Watson 2003: 234). Nor does there seem to 
be evidence of an “obvious concentration of trade between countries whose economies 
are most institutionally dissimilar” (ibid.: 236).
Second, the fact that mainstream VoC reasoning explains national institutional con-
figurations in terms of the economic benefits of “complementarity” raises well-known 
general questions on the merits and demerits of functionalism in the social sciences (on 
the following see Crouch et al. 2005). Defining complementarity as structural homoge-
neity of institutional practices, in particular in industrial relations and corporate gov-
ernance, Hall and Gingerich (2004) claim to have found that countries with homoge-
neous institutions, supporting either markets or “strategic coordination,” perform bet-
ter economically than countries with heterogeneous institutions. Höpner (2005: 340), 
however, notes that the “clustering” of homogeneous institutions “is an indication for 
compatibility, but no proof of complementarity.” Moreover, in the German case which 
Höpner has studied, more market-driven corporate governance has served to tighten 
cooperation and coordination between management and labor at the enterprise level. 
Höpner also argues that structural homogeneity may be due not to higher efficiency, but 
“simply (to) the existence of culturally related ‘families of nations’ in the OECD world” 
(2005: 334). Furthermore, several studies find no empirical support for the claim of the 
economic superiority of “pure” cases (see, for example, Kenworthy 2006).
A related theme is whether functional complementarity requires structural homoge-
neity or whether performance, for example with respect to innovation, might not, to 
the contrary, be enhanced by a mix of different types of institutions inside a national 
economy (Crouch 2005b). Campbell and Pedersen (2007) point to the frequency and 
apparently high economic viability of “hybrid” national systems that combine coor-
dination by institutions with “coordination” by markets, arguing that the functional 
advantages of structural homogeneity, if they exist at all, may be weaker than assumed 
by VoC theory. Outside of functionalist concerns with economic performance, the exis-
tence of hybrid systems (Boyer in Crouch et al. 2005; Höpner 2005; Deeg 2009) can be 
taken as an indication that national institutions are not as tightly coupled as suggested, 
and are tolerant of a good deal of internal diversity and, perhaps, friction (Lane/Wood 
2009). This would appear to allow not just for change and experimentation but also, by 
implication, for the pursuit of non-economic objectives in addition to or in competi-
tion with economic ones. 
Even more fundamentally, any theory that explains the elements of a social system, what-
ever their structural make-up, by their – “complementary” – contribution to a common 
purpose must specify a mechanism that causes and safeguards their functional fit. In 
political economy, this could either be intelligent institutional design by an agent will-
ing and able to take responsibility for optimizing economic performance – for example, 
the government or organized business – or competitive selection in something like an 
efficient market for national institutions. However, neither an all-powerful and theo-
retically competent system designer (Streeck 2004b) nor a market selecting institutional 
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configurations on their complementarity can be identified for contemporary capitalist 
countries (for an extensive discussion of the German case see Streeck 2009, Chapter 
13).51 In both respects, Paul Krugman’s dictum applies that “a country is not a com-
pany” (Krugman 1996): not only can it not be structured and restructured from the 
top for the purposes of efficiency and competitiveness, but it comprises a broad variety 
of sometimes conflicting objectives that cannot be authoritatively reduced to a single 
common goal, even that of economic efficiency or prosperity.
A third issue, which is closely related to that of functionalism, is the inherent econo-
mism of the VoC paradigm, as evident in its self-professed “firm-centeredness” and 
its marginalization of politics in favor of policy52 and of culture in favor of efficiency 
(Dore 2003). While traditional theories of capitalism have conceived of their subject as 
a society contingently and unfortunately driven by its economy, in VoC capitalist soci-
ety tends to be treated as an economy, and society and economy as happily unified in a 
joint search for economic efficiency.53 This is close to the rational choice institutional-
ism of the early Douglass North (North/Thomas 1973). Commentators have pointed 
to the virtual absence in the VoC paradigm of labor as an actor with interests different 
from those of capital (see, among others, Howell 2003). They have also pointed to the 
theory’s neglect of the political as distinguished from the economic conditions of so-
cial stability and change (Amable/Palombarini 2009). Others have emphasized the ab-
sence of cultural motives as opposed to economic ones in VoC accounts of stability and 
change in capitalist political economies (for example, Bruff 2008).54 Drawing on the 
case of Germany since the 1970s, Streeck (2009) has argued that, empirically, capitalist 
development cannot be explained as a result of rational economizing but must be ac-
counted for as shaped by a conflict between profit-seeking and the social countermove-
ments contesting the dominance of capitalist market relations over social life.
An important aspect of the underlying economism of mainstream VoC theory is its 
firm- or employer-centered account of the origin and function of the welfare state as 
51 As Amable has argued, complementarity in the sense of a good functional fit between institu-
tions often comes about by accident (Amable 2003), or it may be the combined result of im-
provisation and conjunctural good luck, and is likely therefore to be only temporary (Streeck 
2009). 
52 Compare Pontusson (2005: 164): “The VoC approach theoretically privileges considerations 
pertaining to efficiency and coordination at the expense of considerations pertaining to con-
flicts of interest and the exercise of power.”
53 Marxian materialism considers the rule of the economy over society under capitalism as an 
historical anomaly that must be overcome by revolutionary politics if civilization is not to per-
ish. By contrast, “vulgar materialism,” the rise of which in the nineteenth century made the late 
Marx insist that he was “not a Marxist,” sees the dominance of the economy over society as nor-
mal, and undertakes as a theoretical strategy to explain the social by reducing it to the economic. 
Much of today’s political economy literature is in this sense vulgar-materialistic. 
54 While Hall and Soskice mention culture, albeit only as a lubricant for effective coordination of 
economic transactions (ibid.: 12–14; see also Dore 2003), Bruff (2008) insists on a Gramscian 
concept of cultural hegemony shaping and stabilizing historical social formations. 
32 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /12
an institutional device designed to enhance the efficiency of economic transactions. 
Several chapters in the 2001 volume, very much in the “Third Way” spirit of the time, 
suggest an economic-productivist explanation (a “welfare production regime theory”) 
of the rise of social protection (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Mares 2001), contradicting the 
power resource model of capitalist variety. The difference is nicely detailed, and the dif-
ficulties of the economistic position are spelled out at length, in a pointed rejoinder by 
Korpi (2006).
The key concept in the economistic reinterpretation of the welfare state is asset speci-
ficity (Iversen/Soskice 2001), and the substantive area in which it came to be primarily 
applied is skills and skill formation (Culpepper 2002; Iversen/Stephens 2008). As Korpi 
(2006) has pointed out, these take the place in welfare production regime theory of class 
and class politics in traditional theories of capitalism. According to Williamsonian in-
stitutional economics, transactions involving specialized assets are more vulnerable and 
therefore less likely to come to pass. For them to be possible, more sophisticated coordi-
nating institutions are required offering reassurance to actors that would have to invest in 
transaction-specific assets. Asset theories of capitalist variety explain political-economic 
institutions, in economic-reductionist fashion, by the kind of assets traded in economic 
transactions. Thus differences between capitalist political economies with respect to la-
bor market and welfare state institutions are explained as voluntary differences in typical 
skill endowments giving rise to different preferences of the median voter. In particular, 
the presence and absence, respectively, of employment protection and unemployment 
insurance in “CMEs” and “LMEs” is accounted for by the fact that skills in the former are 
presumably more specific and in the latter more general, in the sense of more widely and 
easily transferable (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). The argument – which explains low social 
protection in the US by economically rational low demand for it on the part of workers 
– has triggered extensive debate, both empirical, in particular with regard to how “skill 
specificity” may be measured, and theoretical (Korpi 2006). Reviewing that debate, Gal-
lie (2007) concludes that power resource theory trumps VoC in accounting for different 
patterns of labor market regulation and, in particular, of constraints on employers. Most 
recently, it has been argued that the transferability or non-transferability of skills is less 
an intrinsic quality of the latter – and thus exogenous to a country’s regulatory institu-
tions – than something determined by institutional arrangements (Busemeyer 2009).55
The fourth major issue in debates on capitalist variety is change (on the following, see 
Deeg/Jackson 2007). Little is said in standard VoC theory about the historical develop-
ment of the two polar types, “liberal” and “coordinated.”56 As to “LMEs,” there is no 
indication of how the New Deal in the United States or the postwar welfare state in Brit-
55 In particular, low transferability of Japanese skills is due not to narrow specialization, or skills 
being too firm-specific to be transferable, but to Japanese employers not allowing workers to 
enter internal labor markets except at the bottom, to deter them from moving and make them 
dependent on their present place of employment.
56 But see Hall (2007).
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ain – as associated, for example, with the Beveridge Report or T.H. Marshall’s celebra-
tion of a politics of social rights (Marshall [1949]1965) – might fit in the conceptual 
framework. That both countries had been much less market-liberal in the past than 
they were in the 1990s, and that this remains unaccounted for in the Hall and Soskice 
approach, has been noted by critics such as Goodin (2003).57 As to “CMEs,” they are 
styled essentially as frozen in the shape they may have had in the 1980s, their subse-
quent “liberalization” being treated as typologically insignificant. In critical response, 
several authors emphasize what they describe as a parallel, equidirectional movement 
in advanced political economies, regardless of type, towards more market-conforming 
modes of governance (Schmidt 2003; Thatcher 2004; Hay 2005). While parallel change 
in the same direction need not lead to convergence (Schmidt 2003), it indicates a sys-
temic dynamism not envisaged by the paradigm leading, among others, the editors and 
authors of a voluminous collection of critical essays on the subject (Morgan et al. 2005) 
to urge a shift of focus from static comparativism to a generally more dynamic perspec-
tive on firms and institutions.58
Generally, the emphasis of VoC theory on complementarity as the force organizing na-
tional institutional configurations limits the possibilities of institutional change (Deeg 
2005). Still, as Goodin reminds us (2003), the bipolar LME/CME schema does allow 
for two modes of change, both of which are seen as occurring at the “coordinated” end 
of the typological continuum. One is erosion of trust which, as Hall and Soskice note, 
is easier to start than to stop (2001a: 63); the other is financial deregulation, which, 
according to them, could be “the string that unravels coordinated market economies” 
(ibid.: 64). While this might be read as a reference to the process of systemic liberaliza-
tion observable in the 1990s throughout the capitalist world, conceptually, both erosion 
of trust and financial deregulation appear, rather than as historical trends, as contingent 
events that could in principle be reversed. In particular, there is no indication that they 
might be linked to specific socioeconomic interests in or conflicts over systemic change. 
The same applies to international pressures, which appear as reinforcing instead of un-
dermining the – static – differences between the two main types (ibid.: 54f.). Referring 
to the treatment of institutional change in VoC, Hay writes of “a rather agentless and 
apolitical conception of institutional adaptation to largely exogenous challenges and 
imperatives and an overly mechanistic understanding of ‘bifurcation’ or ‘dual conver-
gence’ amongst models of capitalism in response to globalization” (Hay 2005: 120).59 
57 The fact that liberalization and deregulation in the United States in the 1970s had to be aggres-
sively advocated and fought for by economists such as George Stigler and social movement 
leaders such as Ralph Nader (with regard to corporate governance; Canedo 2009) has no place 
in the static typology of the mainstream varieties-of-capitalism paradigm.
58 See also Jackson and Deeg (2006: 3), who on the basis of a critical inspection of VoC and similar 
approaches agree that the way forward for a comparative study of capitalism “lies in developing 
a more dynamic view of individual institutions, the linkages between domains, and the role of 
politics and power.”
59 The extent to which “globalization” affects national institutional arrangements is of course an 
old theme. Recently, the VoC debate has been tilting towards the view that economic interna-
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This seems to hold also for Hall and Soskice’s admission that tight inter-institutional 
coupling for complementarity might not just prevent institutional change, but could 
also facilitate it (ibid.: 63f.). Here, too, no room is reserved for political contestation of 
the socioeconomic order, whether “LME” or “CME,” or for historical periodicity and 
the possibility of a limited lifespan for one or both of the two main types.
As indicated, much of the VoC discussion after 2001 was of how to identify and account 
for institutional change, especially change in the direction of liberalization (Streeck/
Thelen 2005). In fact, critical debates on VoC contributed importantly to the emergence 
of institutional change as a central issue in historical institutionalist theory (Mahoney/
Thelen 2010; Thelen 2010). Within the VoC mainstream, efforts were undertaken to 
make the original formulation more dynamic by softening its static-functionalist edge 
(Hall/Soskice 2003; Hall/Thelen 2009). Whether or not the static functionalism of the 
2001 essay was just read into it by its critics, as its defenders sometimes but not always 
suggest, need not be decided here; if it was a misreading, however, it was certainly a 
widespread one.
Related to the discussion of change in VoC are recent attempts to ground the LME/
CME distinction in the long-term political history of nations. In a widely read article, 
Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007) try to establish a link, going back well into the 
nineteenth century, between types of capitalism and electoral systems.60 The claim is 
that early liberal economies gave rise to majority voting systems, whereas economies 
with traditionally high coordination favored proportional representation. Again, the 
suggestion is that the connection lies in the predominant nature of economic resources. 
While proportional representation is said to support regulatory regimes that protect 
“co-specific investments,” majoritarian systems allegedly suit the political-economic in-
terests of capitalists employing more mobile, general assets. Subsequent discussion will 
have to explore whether the correlations on which the theory is based are more than 
spurious and in what direction, if any, the historical lines of causation run.
7 From static variety to dynamic commonalities
The worldwide economic crisis that began in 2007 has revived interest in what different 
national capitalisms have in common and how they are connected, as opposed to where 
they differ. In particular, as the sudden outbreak of the crisis has drawn attention to the 
tionalization does erode national “models” (Cerny et al. 2006), especially in Europe, where it 
takes the form of European integration (Menz 2005), and that it changes, in particular, “social” 
forms of capitalism in the direction of a more market-driven economic order (Perraton 2009).
60 For another, less functionalist and more qualitative account of the history of capitalist variety 
see Hall (2007).
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dynamic nature – the Eigendynamik – of capitalism, the VoC typology is found wanting 
with regard to the nature of the beast whose diverse appearances it pretends to explore.61 
The crisis has also brought back the memory, still vivid until only a few decades ago, of 
the self-destructive potential of capitalism – a topic that was at the center of traditional 
theories, from Marx to Schumpeter, but had been lost in rationalist-functionalist ac-
counts of capitalist diversity, as constructed in the “end of history” decade of the 1990s. 
Moreover, the crisis has thrown into high relief the international interdependence of 
national capitalist economies and societies, which causes developments in one country 
to have potentially far-reaching consequences in others, regardless of whether they are 
of the same “variety” or not.
In the following, I will single out four themes that future research on capitalism will 
likely have to address, themes that as far as I can see call for a paradigm shift from a 
focus on static varieties of capitalism as a socioeconomic formation to a focus on its 
dynamic commonalities: 
(1) Older theories describe capitalism as a uniquely dynamic and thus fundamentally 
modern economy-cum-society that is constantly evolving, driven by endogenous pres-
sures for continuous expansion. Static “models” of capitalism have failed to capture the 
genuinely historical nature of a nontraditional political economy evolving into an open 
future (Keynes 1937). Capitalist development, of whatever “variety,” has been described 
as a self-driven expansion of market relations, extensive with regard to their territo-
rial reach and intensive in terms of a progressive commodification of social relations 
(McMurtry 1999). It is this process for which Rosa Luxemburg, a much underestimated 
theorist of political economy, coined the metaphor of Landnahme, or land-grabbing 
(Luxemburg 1913). The idea behind it is reflected in the inability of modern economics 
and political economy to imagine a “variety” of capitalism that is not growing, that is, 
not commodifying and monetarizing more and more social transactions so that their 
“value” can be measured and a surplus can be extracted from them.62
Capitalist development has often been conceived as subject to historical periodicity. Pe-
riods, or stages, of capitalist development have always been central to the approach of 
the French régulation school (Boyer 2001, 2005; Boyer/Saillard 2002). While the régula-
tion approach does recognize differences between national capitalisms and tries to in-
terpret them systemically, it is also and perhaps primarily concerned with the evolution 
of capitalism over different historical periods. Central to it is a notion of endogenous 
61 As Pontusson laconically puts it (2005: 164), “the VoC literature has a great deal to say about 
‘varieties,’ but surprisingly little to say about ‘capitalism.’”
62 All notions of capitalist development go back, in one way or another, to Marx’s concept of ex-
tended capitalist reproduction, as summarized in his famous M→C→M’ formula. The formula 
represents the process of capital accumulation through the extraction of surplus value. Another 
way of understanding the specific dynamic of capitalism is to emphasize its intimate relation-
ship with a credit system that requires growth as a condition of future repayment of current 
debt (Ingham 2004).
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crisis of each capitalist “growth regime,” leading to a search for a new institutional equi-
librium which, however, will also serve only for a limited time span. A post-VoC theory 
of capitalism can borrow from the régulation approach the notion of periodicity, with-
out necessarily buying into the idea of political-economic equilibrium. In contrast to 
VoC, its central message might be, not that different capitalisms can be equally “success-
ful,” but that there was a period in the history of capitalism when capitalism as such was 
successful, followed by an extended crisis and a historical effort, with open event, to 
establish an effective post-Fordist accumulation process.
In any case, bringing historical dynamics back into the study of capitalism allows for 
recognition of the parallelism and interdependence of the tendencies toward liberaliza-
tion that have been dominant in Western capitalist societies since the 1980s. In this vein, 
Albo (2005) suggests that VoC has not captured the variety of capitalism as such, but 
rather that of the neoliberalism of the late twentieth century, or what he calls the “new 
capitalism.” From a dynamic perspective, late-twentieth century liberalization can be 
thought of as an interconnected common response of national capitalisms after they 
had become stagnant in the 1970s, in particular as an attempt to escape from the po-
litical constraints imposed on capitalist accumulation in the New Deal and the post-
war settlement after 1945 (Glyn 2006).63 Again, traditional theories of capitalism, here 
the notion of capital accumulation proceeding by way of market pressures breaking 
through their institutional containment, seem to offer a more realistic account of the 
working of the capitalist political economy than concepts of bifurcated convergence on 
two alternative, equally transaction cost-efficient “models” of a “market economy” con-
ceived of as an equilibrated machine for the production of prosperity.
(2) Growing inequality in all variants of capitalism (Pontusson 2005) and the bailout 
under duress of the global financial sector by governments at the expense of citizens 
have made efficiency-theoretical accounts of capitalism and its “varieties” even less con-
vincing. As a consequence, the monistic image of a capitalist political economy as a joint 
enterprise of firms and governments working together to increase “efficiency” may be 
expected increasingly to give way to a more pluralist model of capitalism-as-capitalism, 
instead of capitalism-as-market economy – a model that assigns a prominent place to 
conflict and contradiction, in addition to and probably prior to cooperation and coor-
dination. Concepts such as power, as in the power resource model, and constraint, as in 
historical institutionalism, will need to be brought back if the dynamic of capitalist de-
velopment is to be understood. This includes the notion that conflicts under capitalism, 
fought out with political power and constrained by institutions, are conceived as more 
than just struggles over the distribution of the results of joint production: importantly, 
they are also about which spheres of life should legitimately be subject to commodifica-
tion, and which should remain protected from the expansion of market relations.
63 For a recent attempt to revive convergence theory to account for the parallel neoliberal evolu-
tion since the 1990s of industrial relations in European countries, see a brilliant, empirically 
based paper by Baccaro and Howell (2010). See also Christel Lane (2005) with regard to corpo-
rate governance.
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Capitalist societies, this implies, and indeed all societies, should not be modeled as dedi-
cated to just one objective, even if that was to be their “survival” in economic or political 
“competition.” This is the fundamental idea behind Polanyi’s image of capitalist devel-
opment proceeding through a “double movement”: a struggle between the forces or 
tendencies of commodification and of the “disembedding” of market exchange on the 
one hand, and those of containment of commodification, or “re-embedding” and social 
reconstruction, on the other.64 The same idea underlies Habermas’ notion of a conflict 
between capitalist rationalization and the “life world” (Habermas 1987). A theory of 
capitalism that recognizes the pluralist, multi-dimensional and internally conflicted 
nature of social systems restores politics to the central place it deserves, in contrast to 
efficiency theories in which politics is about no more than the instrumental problem 
of defining and implementing the most efficient institutions for the essentially techno-
cratic task of “coordination.” Moreover, a theory like Polanyi’s that conceives of politics 
as an open struggle between values and interests that are not easily reconciled, if at all, 
ceases to be deterministic, just as the dynamic of social development that it describes no 
longer needs to appear to be one-dimensional or linear. Among other things, this makes 
it possible to allow for capitalist expansion to be halted for historical periods, or to have 
to move one step back for every two steps forward, or even to be reversed if a resisting 
society defending its cohesion and seeking security from the vagaries of markets man-
ages to build up enough political muscle for the purpose.
An elegant way of restoring politics, conflict and power to the study of capitalism with-
out abandoning production, cooperation and coordination – the principal concerns, in 
other words, of VoC – has been suggested by Martin Höpner (2007). Höpner argues that 
“nonliberal” capitalism was not just coordinated but also organized, with institutions 
providing not only for the efficiency of markets but also for their social containment 
and control. The implication is that nonliberal capitalism can become less organized, 
and in this sense liberalized, without necessarily becoming less coordinated. While the 
differences in production regimes that are central to VoC may remain, political regimes 
may become more similar as the social obligations imposed on firms under organized 
but not under coordinated capitalism wither away.65 
64 This reading of Polanyi is, of course, in sharp distinction from the “always embedded,” func-
tionalist tradition of the, mostly American, Polanyi reception (Streeck 2009, Chapter 13). That 
ultimately no economy can work without social integration is no reason why “disembedding” 
should not be tried by capitalist actors seeking individual advantage and freedom from collec-
tive constraint. Nor is there any guarantee that societies will always be able to invent and build 
the institutions required for embedding or re-embedding a self-driven, expanding system like 
modern capitalism. The hard core of Polanyian theory is that the institutions that capitalists may 
be able to construct voluntarily for their own benefit – that is, in their search for profitable ef-
ficiency – are not enough to secure the social integration and cohesion ultimately required for a 
functioning economy and, thus, for their search for profit to be sustainable. See Beckert (2009).
65 While strongly emphasizing the role of politics in the “coordination” of capitalist political 
economies, Martin and Thelen (2007) do not distinguish between state intervention facilitating 
productive cooperation and state intervention constraining the more powerful participants in 
market exchange. The critical distinction in comparative theories of capitalism today seems to 
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(3) Arguing against neoliberal theories of and demands for convergence on a single, 
market-driven “best practice” model of capitalism, theories of capitalist variety have 
tended, not only to neglect the commonalities of national capitalisms, but also to down-
play their interdependence. The dramatic events after 2007, with a bubble in the US 
subprime mortgage market resulting, among other things, in millions of people around 
the world having to spend years of their lives unemployed, not to mention the possible 
bankruptcy of sovereign states, are beginning to revive memories of the Great Depres-
sion and the tight coupling of national capitalisms in an encompassing world system. 
Theories of capitalist variety in the 1990s emphasized the limits imposed by pressures 
for complementarity or, in the historical-institutionalist model, by path dependence 
on the diffusion of institutionalized practices from one country to another, and in this 
sense on cross-national convergence. That boundary-crossing transactions, in markets 
as well as inside multinational corporations, had increased in significance in recent 
decades was sometimes recognized, although it was typically claimed that internation-
alization had not advanced much beyond what it was before the First World War. Even 
where “globalization” was considered important, however, the argument was basically 
that its impact on national political economies was sufficiently moderated by national 
institutions to keep the identity and autonomy of national variants of capitalism intact 
(Hall/Soskice 2001a: 54f.).
It is hard to see how a view as sanguine as this could survive the experience of the 
global crisis and its proliferation along the transnational linkages created by dynami-
cally expanding international markets, in particular for finance. What might have to 
be overcome in future theory and research is not just a lack of systematic attention to 
international interdependence and the possibilities it creates for institutional diffusion. 
Even more importantly, the very notion of sectorally and institutionally complete, sym-
metrical and therefore comparable national capitalist systems may have to be given up. 
If it is true that national financial sectors have long been effectively integrated into a 
global financial industry headquartered in the United States, this must cast doubt on 
the continued applicability of the rationalist-functionalist core concept of complemen-
tarity. At the time of writing, it seems more than possible that the effort of capitalist 
states to re-regulate the financial industry, jointly or individually, will end with the re-
alization that the only country that is still institutionally complete – that is, which has a 
financial sector of its own that it can decide to regulate or not to regulate – is the United 
States.66 All others may have no choice but to follow and live with what the United 
States is willing or able to do.
(4) Ultimately, political economy might have to abandon entirely the idea of national 
varieties of capitalism and advance towards a concept of an internationally variegated 
capitalist world system. There is no need for a theory of global capitalism to deny the 
be if they ascribe more functions to politics than merely providing support for efficient and 
competitive production. 
66 China might be another such country, but if it was, the implications are far from clear.
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possibility of diversity, along national or regional lines, just as current theories of na-
tional capitalism sometimes allow for internal variation between regimes and practices 
by subnational territories or economic sectors. In recent years, the concept of “varie-
gated capitalism” (Peck/Theodore 2007) has been put forward in explicit criticism of 
the VoC approach, not in an attempt to deny differences, but in order to place them in 
a context of economic and political interdependence. 
Conceiving of capitalism as a more or less integrated global system67 must not, of 
course, be taken to imply an equally integrated global regime of economic governance, 
let alone of political government. This would amount to another functionalist fallacy, 
as there is no reason to believe that, where market relations spread, they are automati-
cally followed by institutions regulating them, even though their long-term stability 
would depend on this. To the contrary, it seems to be characteristic of capitalism that 
market expansion tends to outpace institution-building, even where regulation may be 
desirable and is in fact desired by market participants themselves. For regulation to fol-
low market expansion, a political capacity is needed that is capable of disciplining the 
potentially self-destructive actions of self-interested, essentially anarchic profit-seekers. 
The existence of such a capacity cannot be taken for granted, and where it exists it may 
become obsolete or fall apart in the course of social or economic change. The crisis has 
restored the memory – and may increasingly do so – of the fact that, unlike the neoclas-
sical model, a real-world capitalist political economy-cum-society has no equilibrium 
that it could and would attain and maintain without political intervention. If this holds 
for national capitalisms, as it clearly does, it should hold all the more for capitalism as 
a global system.
8 Towards a new paradigm: A tentative summary
Current tendencies in the study of the capitalist political economy, as inspired by a 
decade-long debate on VoC as well as by contemporary events, are summarized in Table 
2.  Increasingly, equilibrium theories of national institutions are giving way to theories 
emphasizing institutional change, both endogenous and driven by globally expand-
ing markets. Theoretical interest is focusing less on the self-stabilization of comple-
mentary institutions at national level and more on the international dependence and 
interdependence of national institutional configurations embedded in global markets, 
as distinguished from embedding national markets. Markets are studied as potentially 
destabilizing their institutional context, rather than as being always and necessarily sta-
bilized and contained by it, and as expanding faster than the institutions by which they 
are supposed to be regulated. In the emerging new paradigm for the study of capitalism 
– which has much similarity with older paradigms – maximization of profit takes the 
67 As suggested by, among others, Panitch and Gindin (2005).
40 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /12
place of maximization of efficiency, and economic outcomes are attributed as much to 
agents interested in private gain as to public institutions designed to ensure an efficient 
use of scarce resources. Empirical research is increasingly looking at crises and contra-
dictions instead of stability and coherence, conflict is considered the rule rather than 
the exception, and compromise is expected to precede cooperation. Differences over 
time between periods of capitalist development trump differences between places, or 
countries (Coates 2005a). Instead of competition between countries and coordination 
within them, political economy is again giving primacy to conflicts between actors in-
side and outside of markets over where the laws of the market should apply and where 
not. The political may finally be put back into political economy as it ceases to consider 
countries as firms and polities as “firm-centered.” Instead, it may rediscover them as 
republics housing a variety of conflicting economic and non-economic concerns, all of 
which in one way or other related to the inherent dynamism of the capitalist mode of 
production and in need of adjudication through national and international politics.
Table 2 Varieties and commonalities of capitalism as competing paradigms:  
  Areas of attention and leading concepts
“Varieties” “Commonalities”
National institutions Global markets
Institutional sovereignty Institutional (inter-)dependence
Market-conforming institutions Markets subverting institutions 
Static reproduction of institutionalized  
economic relations
Dynamic expansion of institutionally  
subversive economic relations 
Politically reproduced economic stability 
(performance) 
Economically driven economic instability  
(evolution)
Institutions leading the economy Institutions lagging the economy 
Efficiency-maximizing institutions Profit-maximizing agents
Economic relations socialized Economic relations under-socialized 
Institutional coherence Institutional contradictions
Cooperation Conflict, compromise
Differences between places (nations) Differences over time (periods)
Countries as firms Countries as republics
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